Saturday 31 January 2009
Thursday 29 January 2009
The Battle of Passchendaele
The Battle of Passchendaele, or Third Battle of Ypres was one of the major battles of World War I. The battle consisted of a series of operations starting in June 1917 and petering out in November 1917 in which Entente troops under British command attacked the Imperial German Army. The battle was fought for control of the village of Passchendale near the town of Ypres in West Flanders,Belgium.
The attack served several strategic purposes. A successful attack offered the British chance of inflicting significant casualties on the German army. A breakthrough in Flanders would hinder the German submarine campaign against British shipping, and also help prevent German bombers from attacking targets in mainland Britain. Whether successful or not, the attack would prevent the German Army from exploiting the serious morale problems of the French.
During the battle, British troops launched several massive attacks, heavily supported by artillery and aircraft. However, they never managed to make a breakthrough in well-entrenched German lines. The battle consisted of a series of 'Bite and Hold' attacks to capture critical terrain and wear down the German army, lasting until the Canadian Corps took Passchendaele on 6 November 1917, ending the battle.
Passchendaele has become synonymous with the misery of fighting in thick mud. Most of the battle took place on reclaimed marshland, swampy even without rain. 1917 had an unusually cold and wet summer, and heavy artillery bombardment tore up the surface of the land. Though there were dry periods, mud nevertheless feature of the landscape; newly-developed tanks bogged down in mud, and soldiers drowned in it.
The battle is a subject of fierce debate among historians, particularly in Britain. The volume of the British Official History of the War which covered Passchendaele was the last to be published, and there is evidence it was biased to reflect well on Douglas Haig and badly on General Gough, the commander of the Fifth Army. The heavy casualties suffered by the British Army in return for slender territorial gains have led many historians to follow the example of David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of the time, and use it as an example of senseless waste and poor generalship. There is also a revisionist school of thought which seeks to emphasise the achievements of the British Army in the battle, in inflicting great damage on the German Army, relieving pressure on the distressed French, and developing offensive tactics capable of dealing with German defensive positions, which were significant in winning the war in 1918.
Casualty figures for the battle are still a matter of some controversy. Some accounts suggest that the Allies suffered significantly heavier losses than the Germans, while others offer an even score. However, no-one disputes that hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides were killed or crippled.
The Entente grand strategy for 1917 was agreed at a conference in Chantilly in November 1916, and a series of subsequent meetings. The Entente would overwhelm the Central Powers by means of attacks on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts. Early in the New Year, the Prime Minister David Lloyd George proposed at a conference in Rome that British and French artillery should be transferred to the Italian front to add weight to the offensive there. This suggestion attracteed the overt opposition of the French and Italian delegations, as well as the covert opposition of the British officers, and was discarded. However, the new French Commander-in-Chief, Robert Nivelle, believed that a concentrated attack by French forces on the Western Front in Spring 1917 could break the German front and lead to a quick victory. Nivelle's plan was welcomed by the British; while many were sceptical that the French would deliver a breakthrough, a French attack would nevertheless mean less of the burden of the war in 1917 falling on British shoulders. Nonetheless, Haig was ordered to prepare a major British offensive.
For some time, the idea of a Flanders offensive had been in Haig's mind. In January 1916, Haig had ordered plans to be drawn up for an attack in Flanders, and the attack might well have happened that year had the Germans not launched the Battle of Verdun. In December 1916, Haig identified Flanders as the most promising theatre for a British offensive of 1917. and by January 1917 the idea of a Flanders offensive had met with the approval of the British Cabinet Ypres was the only Belgian city not in German hands, and had become an important political symbol; if the Germans ever captured Ypres, they would be able to threaten the Channel ports and so threaten British supply lines. Driving the Germans away from Ypres would be a valuable objective. Furthermore, roughly one-third of the U-boats which had recently begun unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain were based in occupied Belgian ports. These assumed great importance in spring 1917 as shipping losses mounted and people began to ask "Can the Army win the war before the Navy lose it?",; taking Passchendaele, and Roulers behind it, would threaten the Belgian ports. Indeed, if the attack went very well it would be possible to outflank the whole German position in Belgium and threaten the German industrial heartland on the Ruhr, which might win the war quickly.
For the British generals, it was also considered valuable that the German Army would fight hard to retain its positions in Flanders. In the Somme sector, which had seen the major British attack of 1916, German troops could withdraw up to 15 miles without affecting their strategic position. This was in fact just what they did in March 1917. By contrast, the strategic importance of Flanders meant German troops would be loath to withdraw, and would hold their ground even under unfavourable circumstances. Haig was optimistic that the German Army would soon run out of manpower because of the heavy losses suffered on the Somme and at Verdun.
In April 1917, the planned French attack—the "Nivelle Offensive"—took place beginning in April 1917, with the main effort by the French on the Aisne while British and Empire forces undertook a preliminary, secondary, attack at Arras. The French attack failed disastrously. Nivelle was relieved and replaced by Philippe Petain. Over the course of the summer, it became clear that the failure of the offensive had caused a collapse in morale amongst French troops. However, the failure of the French attack only reinforced the importance of the British offensive, as the French were exhausted, and Lloyd George had no option but to support Haig's planned attack. Through May, the plans for the Flanders offensive were worked out in more detail, and on 7 June 1917 the first stage of the attack was launched.
The situation around Ypres had changed relatively little since the end of the First Battle of Ypres in October 1914. The British held the town of Ypres itself, while the Germans held the high ground of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge to the south of the town, the lower ridges the east and the flat ground to the north. Ypres was therefore in a salient sticking out into German positions and overlooked by German artillery on higher ground. The geography of the Salient also meant that it was difficult for the British forces to gain any observation of the German rear areas east of the ridges.The high ground would, indeed, prove crucial to the British offensive.
The Germans were aware that an attack in the Flanders sector was very likely, and had prepared extensive positions. German experience during 1916 indicated that it was relatively easy for a British assault to take over the first line of defence supported by heavy artillery. Furthermore, the terrain in most of the Salient was muddy and not good for digging trenches. Therefore, the Germans controlled the forward area with mutually supporting positions, generally based on concrete pillboxes or blockhouses protected by barbed wire, making use of existing buildings or vegetation where possible. To the rear of this zone were a series of five reserve lines of defence.
The other principal feature of the Ypres salient was mud. Apart from the 'ridges', the battlefield was very low-lying, almost no higher than sea level. Naturally swampy, these plains were only viable farmland thanks to a dense irrigation system.After several years of fighting in the area, this was largely destroyed. 1917 was also a year of particularly foul weather, with a very late spring and not much summer to speak of. There were thunderstorms in July and August, and while September was dry, October and onwards were wet. The mud was to become one of the defining features of the battle for soldiers on both sides, and did a great deal to hamper British operations. Haig was certainly aware of the nature of the ground he was launching his attack over, and was closely monitoring the weather conditions faced by his troops. However, what he knew, or ought to have known, about the likely weather conditions is one of the many controversies about the battle.
The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. These German positions dominated Ypres and, unless neutralised, would be able to enfilade any British attack eastwards from the Salient. Messines and Wytschaete were exposed as well as powerful, and their defence was a preoccupation of the German troops in the sector. Both villages had been heavily fortified, and the area was littered with pillboxes, blockhouses and dugouts. In accordance with the German Army's newly-developed defensive methods, the forward area was lightly held, with counter-attack formations held in reserve.
The attack on Messines was the responsibility of General Sir Herbert Plumer and the British Second Army. Plumer's plan called on nine infantry divisions from X, IX and II Anzac Corps to advance 1,500 yards and take the first line of German defences on the front line of the ridge. This plan was extended by Haig to require the capture of the second line of defences on the rear crest of the ridge, including Wytschate itself, and also to move down the reverse slope to take a further line of defences. This would mean an advance of about 3,000 yards.
A massive preparatory bombardment for the attack began on 21 May. Plumer deployed a total of 2,266 artillery pieces, of which 757 were heavy-calibre. A particular role of the bombardment was counter-battery fire against German artillery positions. In spite of the Germans bringing 630 guns to bear, this was largely successful.
The British advance began on 7 June, and was preceded by a unique display of military pyrotechnics. Since mid-1915, the British had been constructing mines under the German positions on the Messines Ridge. By June 1917, a total of 21 mines had been dug, filled with nearly 1,000,000 lb (450,000 kg) of high explosive between them. The Germans were aware of British mining efforts, and had taken some countermeasures, but the scale of the mines came as a total surprise to them. Two of the British mines failed to detonate, but the remaining 19 were fired simultaneously at 03.10 GMT. The impact was immense, destroying a large part of the German front line and support positions. The sound was audible 200km away.
"Suddenly at 4am there was an almighty roar and the earth began to quake: Explosion! Attack! Both officers and men poured out of the entrance into the open air. An awe-inspiring and appalling sight met their eyes. The hills from Wijtschate to Messines were enveloped in a sea of flames. Fourteen fiery volcanos and masses of earth erupted vertically into the sky colouring it a blood red. Then the great masses of earth crashed back down to the ground and, simultaneously, drum fire of unprecedented violence crashed down."
As soon as the mines exploded, the British guns sprang back into life, providing a heavy creeping barrage which was closely followed by assaulting infantry and tanks. Messines itself was taken at around 05.00. The second phase of the attack began at 07.00 and by 09.00 the British had taken Wytschaete. German resistance was scant and German positions were overwhelmed. At 15.10 the attack was as fresh troops, supported by tanks, pressed down the ridge to the final objectives, which were largely gained before dark on the 7th. British losses in the morning were light, although the plan had expected casualties of up to 50% in the initial attack. As the advance continued over the ridge, British supporting artillery was less able to provide supporting fire, while giving easier opportunities to German artillery fire.Fighting continued around Messines Ridge until June 12th. The attack was generally considered a success. It demonstrated that, by bringing overwhelming firepower to bear and resisting the temptation to set over-ambitious goals, it was possible to possible for the attacking side to prevail, even against fortified positions. Over 7,000 German prisoners were taken, along with 48 artillery pieces.
As a second stage of the action, General Sir Hubert Gough was put in charge of the attacks to secure the Gheluvelt Plateau which overlooked Ypres. Many field guns were moved into the area and started a four-day bombardment, but the Germans recognized the sign of an impending offensive, and moved more troops in to reinforce the defences.
In July the Germans used mustard gas for the first time. It attacked sensitive parts of the body, caused blistering, damage to the lungs and inflammation of the eyes, causing blindness (sometimes temporary) and great pain.
One problem in carrying the offensive forward was the Yser Canal, but this was taken on 27 July when the Allies found the German trenches empty.
31 July Four days later, the main offensive opened with a major assault at Pilckem ridge, when the Allies gained about 2,000 yards (1,800 m). The Allies suffered about thirty-two thousand casualties — killed, wounded or missing — in this one action. This was another example of the new 'bite-and-hold' tactics that were proving successful in clearing German defences. German casualties were also substantial, not least because Allied artillery had learned to anticipate the usual German counterattack and were ready for it.
16 - 18 August Ground conditions during the whole Ypres-Passchendaele action were bad because the ground was already fought-over and partially flooded. Continuous shelling had destroyed drainage canals in the area, and unseasonable heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud and water-filled shell-craters. The troops walked up to the front over paths made of duckboards laid across the mud, often carrying up to one hundred pounds (45 kg) of equipment. It was possible for them to slip off the path into the craters and drown before they could be rescued. The trees were reduced to blunted trunks, the branches and leaves torn away, and the bodies of men buried after previous actions were often uncovered by the rain or later shelling.
The strategy known as "bite and hold" favoured by Plumer was adopted for the actions of September and October, after the bad weather in August had contributed to the failures of earlier large-scale attacks. The idea was to make small gains which could be held against counterattack. Sir Herbert Plumer replaced Hubert Gough in command of the offensive.
By now, 1,295 guns were concentrated in the area, approximately one for every five yards of attack front. On 20 September at the battle of Menin Road, after a massive bombardment, the Allies attacked and managed to hold their objective of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) gained, despite heavy counterattacks, suffering twenty-one thousand casualties. The Germans by this time had a semi-permanent front line, with very deep dugouts and concrete pillboxes, supported by artillery accurately ranged on no man's land.
The attack was a major success and caused no small panic to German commanders; proving quite clearly to them that well-prepared defences could no longer fend off a well-prepared attack under good conditions. It convinced them that the standard defences of lines of trenches that had served so well up until now was obsolete, and that a more elastic defence system would have to be put in place.
26 September - 3 October Further advances at Polygon Wood and Broodseinde on the southwestern edge of the salient accounted for another two thousand yards and thirty thousand Allied casualties. The British line was now overlooked by the Passchendaele ridge, which therefore became an important objective and made the capture of the high ground even more of an imperative.
Under command of the British Second Army , the New Zealand Division (part of II Anzac Corps) made its first attack on 4 October 1917. Its role was to provide flanking cover for an Australian assault on the Broodseinde Ridge. The New Zealanders’ objective was Gravenstafel Spur, the first of two spurs from the main ridge at Passchendaele (the other was Bellevue Spur). Once again artillery played a big part in the success of the attack, which was made by 1st and 4th brigades.
The bombardment, which began at 6 a.m., caught many Germans in the front lines, causing heavy casualties and disrupting the defence. Although the going was difficult – ‘The mud is a worse enemy than the German,’ divisional commander Sir Andrew Russell complained – the New Zealand troops advanced 1000 metres to secure the spur and consolidate their position. More than a thousand prisoners were taken, but the attack cost more than 320 New Zealand lives, including that of the former All Black captain Dave Gallaher.
The Second Army captured a total of 4152 prisoners during the battle, however this had a tragic aftermath. The British high command mistakenly concluded that the number of enemy casualties meant enemy resistance was faltering. It resolved to make another push immediately. An attack on 9 October by British and Australian troops was to open the way for II Anzac Corps to capture Passchendaele on the 12th.
An advance on 9 October by over 10 divisions of the French First Army, and British 2nd and 5th Armies at Poelkapelle (or Poelcappelle to the British) was a dismal failure for the Allies, with only minor advances by exhausted troops.
The First Battle of Passchendaele, on 12 October 1917 began with a further Allied attempt by 5 British and 3 ANZAC divisions (the New Zealand Division and the Australian 3rd and 4th Divisions) to gain ground around Poelkapelle. The heavy rain again made movement difficult, and artillery could not be brought closer to the front owing to the mud. The Allied troops were fought-out, and morale was suffering. Against the well-prepared German defences, the gains were minimal and there were 13,000 Allied casualties.
On this day there were more than 2,700 New Zealand casualties, of which 45 officers and 800 men were either dead or lying mortally wounded between the lines. In terms of lives lost in a single day, this remains the blackest day in New Zealand’s recorded history.
By this point there had been 100,000 Allied casualties, with only limited gains and no breakthrough.
The Canadian Corps was moved into the line to replace the badly depleted ANZAC forces. Upon his arrival, the Canadian Commander-in-Chief General Sir Arthur Currie expressed the view that the cost of the objective would be sixteen thousand casualties. While Currie viewed this figure as inordinately high in relation to the value of the objective, Haig had estimated that the casualties from remaining in place would be worse if this objective was not taken.
The Canadians moved into the line during mid-October, and on 26 October 1917, the Second Battle of Passchendaele began with twenty thousand men of the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions advancing up the hills of the salient. It cost the Allies twelve thousand casualties for a gain of a few hundred yards.
Reinforced with the addition of two more canadian divisions, a second offensive on 30 October resulted in the capture of the town in heavy rains. For the next five days the force held the town in the face of repeated German shelling and counterattacks, and by the time a second group of reinforcements arrived on 6 November, four-fifths of the infantrymen in two Canadian divisions had been lost.
Their replacements were the First and Second Canadian Divisions. German troops still ringed the area, so a limited attack on the 6th by the remaining troops of the Third Division allowed the First Division to make major advances and gain strong points throughout the area.
One such action on the First Division front was at Hill 52; the Tenth Battalion,CEF were called out of reserve to assist an attack on Hill 52, part of the same low rise where Passchendaele was situated. The Battalion was not scheduled to attack, but the Commanding Officer of the Tenth had wisely prepared his soldiers as if they would be making the main assault – a decision that paid dividends when the unit was called out of reserve. On 10 November 1917, the Tenth Battalion took the feature with light casualties.
A further attack by the Second Division the same day pushed the Germans from the slopes to the east of the town. The high ground was now firmly under Allied control.
After all was said and done, General Currie's casualty estimations sadly proved to be remarkably accurate. The battle of Passchendaele cost the Canadian Corps 15 654 casualties with over 4 000 dead to take roughly 2 square miles or just over 5.2 square kilometres of German held territory in 16 days of fighting.
Canadian soldiers won a remarkable 9 Victoria Crosses in the fighting at Passchendale.
Passchendaele could be regarded, by some, as a re-play of the Somme; an offensive mounted by the British and French Forces designed to make large gains in terms of territory. However, given the importance of the Ypres salient — the campaign to clear the high ground east and south of the much battered city was important, but once it began, it had to be completed.
After months of fighting, the Allies had crawled forward 5 miles (8 kilometres) but had gained the high ground that dominated the salient. The price had been almost half a million men of which around 140,000 had been killed. Also reminiscent of the Somme were the colossal artillery barrages which failed to destroy German defenses, but which did inflict enormous losses that the Germans couldn't afford. Ultimately, as a battle of attrition, that captured some important assets, the campaign can be said to be a lean Allied victory.
Because of the Third Battle of Ypres there were insufficient reserves available to exploit the Allied success at the Battle of Cambrai, the first breakthrough by massed tanks, that restored somewhat the shaken confidence of the British government in the final victory. The politicians were reluctant however to fully replace the manpower losses, for fear the new troops would be sacrificed also. This made the British Army vulnerable to a German attack.
The major German offensive of 1918, Operation Michael, began on 21 March 1918, and a supporting operation which became the Battle of the Lys, began on 9 April. This regained almost all of the ground taken by the Allies at Passchendaele, with the Germans advancing about 6 miles (9.7 km). This meant that every inch of ground gained in the offensive was lost to the Germans, in a space of about three days. However, the Germans were also easily pushed away from Ypres once more in the final and fifth battle around the city in September and October of 1918.
Altogether, the four years of fighting around Ypres claimed the lives of some 300,000 soldiers of the British Empire; of whom 90,000 have no known graves. These battles, and those British Empire soldiers who gave their lives, are commemorated at the Menin Gate Memorial in Ypres, the Tyne Cot Cemetery and Memorial to the missing, the largest Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery in the world with nearly 12,000 graves. The German cemetery in the region is also a massive one, as a sizeable proportion of their casualties on the Western Front also fell around Ypres.
More than any other battle, Passchendaele has come to symbolise the horrific nature of the great battles of the First World War. In terms of the dead, the Germans lost approximately 260,000 men, while the British Empire forces lost about 300,000, including approximately 36,500 Australians, 3,596 New Zealanders and some 16,000 Canadians from 1915 to 1917. 90,000 British and Dominion bodies were never identified, and 42,000 never recovered. Aerial photography showed 1,000,000 shell holes in 1 square mile (2.56 km²).
Squire nagged and bullied till I went to fight,(Under Lord Derby's Scheme). I died in hell-(They called it Passchendaele). My wound was slight,And I was hobbling back; and then a shellBurst slick upon the duck-boards: so I fellInto the bottomless mud, and lost the light.At sermon-time, while Squire is in his pew,He gives my gilded name a thoughtful stare:For, though low down upon the list, I'm there;'In proud and glorious memory' ... that's my due.Two bleeding years I fought in France, for Squire:I suffered anguish that he's never guessed.Once I came home on leave: and then went west...What greater glory could a man desire?"― Siegfried Sassoon-"Memorial Tablet" from Picture Show, (1920) E.P. Dutton The horror of the shell-hole area of Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all. It was mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves, slowly, but steadily, and in dense masses. Caught in the advanced zone by our hail of fire they often collapsed, and the lonely man in the shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass came on again. Rifle and machine-gun jammed with the mud. Man fought against man, and only too often the mass was successful.
—General Erich Ludendorff I stood up and looked over the front of my hole. There was just a dreary waste of mud and water, no relic of civilization, only shell holes… And everywhere were bodies, English and German, in all stages of decomposition.
—Lieutenant Edwin Campion Vaughan
"Passchendaele was just a terrible, terrible place. We used to walk along these wooden duckboards - something like ladders laid on the ground. The Germans would concentrate on these things. If a man was hit and wounded and fell off he could easily drown in the mud and never be seen again. You just did not want to go off the duckboards." Pte Richard Mercer, CEF-1CMMGB, 911016
I fell in a trench. There was a fella there. He must have been about our age. He was ripped shoulder to waist with shrapnel. I held his hand for the last 60 seconds of his life. He only said one word: 'Mother'. I didn't see her, but she was there. No doubt about it. He passed from this life into the next, and it felt as if I was in God's presence. I've never got over it. You never forget it. Never.
—Harry Patch, last survivor of Passchendaele, 12/07/2007 Some of the boys buried here are the same age as me, killed on the same day I was fighting. Anyone of them could have been me. I didn't know whether I would last longer than 5 minutes. We were the Poor Bloody Infantry and we were expendable. What a terrible waste.
Tyne Cot Cemetery its graves, memorial wall and blockhouses is seen by many to be a testament to the ANZAC contribution to the Battle of Passchendaele as the ANZAC forces were the troops who wrested the stronghold from the German defenders. There are of course numerous tributes and memorials all over Australia and New Zealand like the plaques at the Christchurch and Dunedin railway stations to the men of the NZ railway who fell at Passchendaele and in the Great War.
After the war, Canada placed memorials at eight sites where the Canadian Corps had made significant contributions to the fighting in the Great War. The Canadian Battle of Passchendale Memorial is located at the former site of the 'Crest Farm' on the southwest fringe of Passendale village. The memorial is on a street named Canadalaan, which leads from the village further southwest to the final resting place of many of the Canadians killed in the battle, Tyne Cot Cemetery.
One of the newest memorials to be dedicated to the fighting contribution of a group is the Celtic Cross memorial commemorating the Scottish contribution and efforts to the fighting in Flanders during the Great War. The memorial is located on the Frezenberg Ridge where Scotlands 9th and 15th Divisions, as part of the British Army, fought during the Battle of Passchendaele. The monument was dedicated by the Scottish Parliament's Minister for Europe Linda Fabiani during the late summer of 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle.
The attack served several strategic purposes. A successful attack offered the British chance of inflicting significant casualties on the German army. A breakthrough in Flanders would hinder the German submarine campaign against British shipping, and also help prevent German bombers from attacking targets in mainland Britain. Whether successful or not, the attack would prevent the German Army from exploiting the serious morale problems of the French.
During the battle, British troops launched several massive attacks, heavily supported by artillery and aircraft. However, they never managed to make a breakthrough in well-entrenched German lines. The battle consisted of a series of 'Bite and Hold' attacks to capture critical terrain and wear down the German army, lasting until the Canadian Corps took Passchendaele on 6 November 1917, ending the battle.
Passchendaele has become synonymous with the misery of fighting in thick mud. Most of the battle took place on reclaimed marshland, swampy even without rain. 1917 had an unusually cold and wet summer, and heavy artillery bombardment tore up the surface of the land. Though there were dry periods, mud nevertheless feature of the landscape; newly-developed tanks bogged down in mud, and soldiers drowned in it.
The battle is a subject of fierce debate among historians, particularly in Britain. The volume of the British Official History of the War which covered Passchendaele was the last to be published, and there is evidence it was biased to reflect well on Douglas Haig and badly on General Gough, the commander of the Fifth Army. The heavy casualties suffered by the British Army in return for slender territorial gains have led many historians to follow the example of David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of the time, and use it as an example of senseless waste and poor generalship. There is also a revisionist school of thought which seeks to emphasise the achievements of the British Army in the battle, in inflicting great damage on the German Army, relieving pressure on the distressed French, and developing offensive tactics capable of dealing with German defensive positions, which were significant in winning the war in 1918.
Casualty figures for the battle are still a matter of some controversy. Some accounts suggest that the Allies suffered significantly heavier losses than the Germans, while others offer an even score. However, no-one disputes that hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides were killed or crippled.
The Entente grand strategy for 1917 was agreed at a conference in Chantilly in November 1916, and a series of subsequent meetings. The Entente would overwhelm the Central Powers by means of attacks on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts. Early in the New Year, the Prime Minister David Lloyd George proposed at a conference in Rome that British and French artillery should be transferred to the Italian front to add weight to the offensive there. This suggestion attracteed the overt opposition of the French and Italian delegations, as well as the covert opposition of the British officers, and was discarded. However, the new French Commander-in-Chief, Robert Nivelle, believed that a concentrated attack by French forces on the Western Front in Spring 1917 could break the German front and lead to a quick victory. Nivelle's plan was welcomed by the British; while many were sceptical that the French would deliver a breakthrough, a French attack would nevertheless mean less of the burden of the war in 1917 falling on British shoulders. Nonetheless, Haig was ordered to prepare a major British offensive.
For some time, the idea of a Flanders offensive had been in Haig's mind. In January 1916, Haig had ordered plans to be drawn up for an attack in Flanders, and the attack might well have happened that year had the Germans not launched the Battle of Verdun. In December 1916, Haig identified Flanders as the most promising theatre for a British offensive of 1917. and by January 1917 the idea of a Flanders offensive had met with the approval of the British Cabinet Ypres was the only Belgian city not in German hands, and had become an important political symbol; if the Germans ever captured Ypres, they would be able to threaten the Channel ports and so threaten British supply lines. Driving the Germans away from Ypres would be a valuable objective. Furthermore, roughly one-third of the U-boats which had recently begun unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain were based in occupied Belgian ports. These assumed great importance in spring 1917 as shipping losses mounted and people began to ask "Can the Army win the war before the Navy lose it?",; taking Passchendaele, and Roulers behind it, would threaten the Belgian ports. Indeed, if the attack went very well it would be possible to outflank the whole German position in Belgium and threaten the German industrial heartland on the Ruhr, which might win the war quickly.
For the British generals, it was also considered valuable that the German Army would fight hard to retain its positions in Flanders. In the Somme sector, which had seen the major British attack of 1916, German troops could withdraw up to 15 miles without affecting their strategic position. This was in fact just what they did in March 1917. By contrast, the strategic importance of Flanders meant German troops would be loath to withdraw, and would hold their ground even under unfavourable circumstances. Haig was optimistic that the German Army would soon run out of manpower because of the heavy losses suffered on the Somme and at Verdun.
In April 1917, the planned French attack—the "Nivelle Offensive"—took place beginning in April 1917, with the main effort by the French on the Aisne while British and Empire forces undertook a preliminary, secondary, attack at Arras. The French attack failed disastrously. Nivelle was relieved and replaced by Philippe Petain. Over the course of the summer, it became clear that the failure of the offensive had caused a collapse in morale amongst French troops. However, the failure of the French attack only reinforced the importance of the British offensive, as the French were exhausted, and Lloyd George had no option but to support Haig's planned attack. Through May, the plans for the Flanders offensive were worked out in more detail, and on 7 June 1917 the first stage of the attack was launched.
The situation around Ypres had changed relatively little since the end of the First Battle of Ypres in October 1914. The British held the town of Ypres itself, while the Germans held the high ground of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge to the south of the town, the lower ridges the east and the flat ground to the north. Ypres was therefore in a salient sticking out into German positions and overlooked by German artillery on higher ground. The geography of the Salient also meant that it was difficult for the British forces to gain any observation of the German rear areas east of the ridges.The high ground would, indeed, prove crucial to the British offensive.
The Germans were aware that an attack in the Flanders sector was very likely, and had prepared extensive positions. German experience during 1916 indicated that it was relatively easy for a British assault to take over the first line of defence supported by heavy artillery. Furthermore, the terrain in most of the Salient was muddy and not good for digging trenches. Therefore, the Germans controlled the forward area with mutually supporting positions, generally based on concrete pillboxes or blockhouses protected by barbed wire, making use of existing buildings or vegetation where possible. To the rear of this zone were a series of five reserve lines of defence.
The other principal feature of the Ypres salient was mud. Apart from the 'ridges', the battlefield was very low-lying, almost no higher than sea level. Naturally swampy, these plains were only viable farmland thanks to a dense irrigation system.After several years of fighting in the area, this was largely destroyed. 1917 was also a year of particularly foul weather, with a very late spring and not much summer to speak of. There were thunderstorms in July and August, and while September was dry, October and onwards were wet. The mud was to become one of the defining features of the battle for soldiers on both sides, and did a great deal to hamper British operations. Haig was certainly aware of the nature of the ground he was launching his attack over, and was closely monitoring the weather conditions faced by his troops. However, what he knew, or ought to have known, about the likely weather conditions is one of the many controversies about the battle.
The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. These German positions dominated Ypres and, unless neutralised, would be able to enfilade any British attack eastwards from the Salient. Messines and Wytschaete were exposed as well as powerful, and their defence was a preoccupation of the German troops in the sector. Both villages had been heavily fortified, and the area was littered with pillboxes, blockhouses and dugouts. In accordance with the German Army's newly-developed defensive methods, the forward area was lightly held, with counter-attack formations held in reserve.
The attack on Messines was the responsibility of General Sir Herbert Plumer and the British Second Army. Plumer's plan called on nine infantry divisions from X, IX and II Anzac Corps to advance 1,500 yards and take the first line of German defences on the front line of the ridge. This plan was extended by Haig to require the capture of the second line of defences on the rear crest of the ridge, including Wytschate itself, and also to move down the reverse slope to take a further line of defences. This would mean an advance of about 3,000 yards.
A massive preparatory bombardment for the attack began on 21 May. Plumer deployed a total of 2,266 artillery pieces, of which 757 were heavy-calibre. A particular role of the bombardment was counter-battery fire against German artillery positions. In spite of the Germans bringing 630 guns to bear, this was largely successful.
The British advance began on 7 June, and was preceded by a unique display of military pyrotechnics. Since mid-1915, the British had been constructing mines under the German positions on the Messines Ridge. By June 1917, a total of 21 mines had been dug, filled with nearly 1,000,000 lb (450,000 kg) of high explosive between them. The Germans were aware of British mining efforts, and had taken some countermeasures, but the scale of the mines came as a total surprise to them. Two of the British mines failed to detonate, but the remaining 19 were fired simultaneously at 03.10 GMT. The impact was immense, destroying a large part of the German front line and support positions. The sound was audible 200km away.
"Suddenly at 4am there was an almighty roar and the earth began to quake: Explosion! Attack! Both officers and men poured out of the entrance into the open air. An awe-inspiring and appalling sight met their eyes. The hills from Wijtschate to Messines were enveloped in a sea of flames. Fourteen fiery volcanos and masses of earth erupted vertically into the sky colouring it a blood red. Then the great masses of earth crashed back down to the ground and, simultaneously, drum fire of unprecedented violence crashed down."
As soon as the mines exploded, the British guns sprang back into life, providing a heavy creeping barrage which was closely followed by assaulting infantry and tanks. Messines itself was taken at around 05.00. The second phase of the attack began at 07.00 and by 09.00 the British had taken Wytschaete. German resistance was scant and German positions were overwhelmed. At 15.10 the attack was as fresh troops, supported by tanks, pressed down the ridge to the final objectives, which were largely gained before dark on the 7th. British losses in the morning were light, although the plan had expected casualties of up to 50% in the initial attack. As the advance continued over the ridge, British supporting artillery was less able to provide supporting fire, while giving easier opportunities to German artillery fire.Fighting continued around Messines Ridge until June 12th. The attack was generally considered a success. It demonstrated that, by bringing overwhelming firepower to bear and resisting the temptation to set over-ambitious goals, it was possible to possible for the attacking side to prevail, even against fortified positions. Over 7,000 German prisoners were taken, along with 48 artillery pieces.
As a second stage of the action, General Sir Hubert Gough was put in charge of the attacks to secure the Gheluvelt Plateau which overlooked Ypres. Many field guns were moved into the area and started a four-day bombardment, but the Germans recognized the sign of an impending offensive, and moved more troops in to reinforce the defences.
In July the Germans used mustard gas for the first time. It attacked sensitive parts of the body, caused blistering, damage to the lungs and inflammation of the eyes, causing blindness (sometimes temporary) and great pain.
One problem in carrying the offensive forward was the Yser Canal, but this was taken on 27 July when the Allies found the German trenches empty.
31 July Four days later, the main offensive opened with a major assault at Pilckem ridge, when the Allies gained about 2,000 yards (1,800 m). The Allies suffered about thirty-two thousand casualties — killed, wounded or missing — in this one action. This was another example of the new 'bite-and-hold' tactics that were proving successful in clearing German defences. German casualties were also substantial, not least because Allied artillery had learned to anticipate the usual German counterattack and were ready for it.
16 - 18 August Ground conditions during the whole Ypres-Passchendaele action were bad because the ground was already fought-over and partially flooded. Continuous shelling had destroyed drainage canals in the area, and unseasonable heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud and water-filled shell-craters. The troops walked up to the front over paths made of duckboards laid across the mud, often carrying up to one hundred pounds (45 kg) of equipment. It was possible for them to slip off the path into the craters and drown before they could be rescued. The trees were reduced to blunted trunks, the branches and leaves torn away, and the bodies of men buried after previous actions were often uncovered by the rain or later shelling.
The strategy known as "bite and hold" favoured by Plumer was adopted for the actions of September and October, after the bad weather in August had contributed to the failures of earlier large-scale attacks. The idea was to make small gains which could be held against counterattack. Sir Herbert Plumer replaced Hubert Gough in command of the offensive.
By now, 1,295 guns were concentrated in the area, approximately one for every five yards of attack front. On 20 September at the battle of Menin Road, after a massive bombardment, the Allies attacked and managed to hold their objective of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) gained, despite heavy counterattacks, suffering twenty-one thousand casualties. The Germans by this time had a semi-permanent front line, with very deep dugouts and concrete pillboxes, supported by artillery accurately ranged on no man's land.
The attack was a major success and caused no small panic to German commanders; proving quite clearly to them that well-prepared defences could no longer fend off a well-prepared attack under good conditions. It convinced them that the standard defences of lines of trenches that had served so well up until now was obsolete, and that a more elastic defence system would have to be put in place.
26 September - 3 October Further advances at Polygon Wood and Broodseinde on the southwestern edge of the salient accounted for another two thousand yards and thirty thousand Allied casualties. The British line was now overlooked by the Passchendaele ridge, which therefore became an important objective and made the capture of the high ground even more of an imperative.
Under command of the British Second Army , the New Zealand Division (part of II Anzac Corps) made its first attack on 4 October 1917. Its role was to provide flanking cover for an Australian assault on the Broodseinde Ridge. The New Zealanders’ objective was Gravenstafel Spur, the first of two spurs from the main ridge at Passchendaele (the other was Bellevue Spur). Once again artillery played a big part in the success of the attack, which was made by 1st and 4th brigades.
The bombardment, which began at 6 a.m., caught many Germans in the front lines, causing heavy casualties and disrupting the defence. Although the going was difficult – ‘The mud is a worse enemy than the German,’ divisional commander Sir Andrew Russell complained – the New Zealand troops advanced 1000 metres to secure the spur and consolidate their position. More than a thousand prisoners were taken, but the attack cost more than 320 New Zealand lives, including that of the former All Black captain Dave Gallaher.
The Second Army captured a total of 4152 prisoners during the battle, however this had a tragic aftermath. The British high command mistakenly concluded that the number of enemy casualties meant enemy resistance was faltering. It resolved to make another push immediately. An attack on 9 October by British and Australian troops was to open the way for II Anzac Corps to capture Passchendaele on the 12th.
An advance on 9 October by over 10 divisions of the French First Army, and British 2nd and 5th Armies at Poelkapelle (or Poelcappelle to the British) was a dismal failure for the Allies, with only minor advances by exhausted troops.
The First Battle of Passchendaele, on 12 October 1917 began with a further Allied attempt by 5 British and 3 ANZAC divisions (the New Zealand Division and the Australian 3rd and 4th Divisions) to gain ground around Poelkapelle. The heavy rain again made movement difficult, and artillery could not be brought closer to the front owing to the mud. The Allied troops were fought-out, and morale was suffering. Against the well-prepared German defences, the gains were minimal and there were 13,000 Allied casualties.
On this day there were more than 2,700 New Zealand casualties, of which 45 officers and 800 men were either dead or lying mortally wounded between the lines. In terms of lives lost in a single day, this remains the blackest day in New Zealand’s recorded history.
By this point there had been 100,000 Allied casualties, with only limited gains and no breakthrough.
The Canadian Corps was moved into the line to replace the badly depleted ANZAC forces. Upon his arrival, the Canadian Commander-in-Chief General Sir Arthur Currie expressed the view that the cost of the objective would be sixteen thousand casualties. While Currie viewed this figure as inordinately high in relation to the value of the objective, Haig had estimated that the casualties from remaining in place would be worse if this objective was not taken.
The Canadians moved into the line during mid-October, and on 26 October 1917, the Second Battle of Passchendaele began with twenty thousand men of the Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions advancing up the hills of the salient. It cost the Allies twelve thousand casualties for a gain of a few hundred yards.
Reinforced with the addition of two more canadian divisions, a second offensive on 30 October resulted in the capture of the town in heavy rains. For the next five days the force held the town in the face of repeated German shelling and counterattacks, and by the time a second group of reinforcements arrived on 6 November, four-fifths of the infantrymen in two Canadian divisions had been lost.
Their replacements were the First and Second Canadian Divisions. German troops still ringed the area, so a limited attack on the 6th by the remaining troops of the Third Division allowed the First Division to make major advances and gain strong points throughout the area.
One such action on the First Division front was at Hill 52; the Tenth Battalion,CEF were called out of reserve to assist an attack on Hill 52, part of the same low rise where Passchendaele was situated. The Battalion was not scheduled to attack, but the Commanding Officer of the Tenth had wisely prepared his soldiers as if they would be making the main assault – a decision that paid dividends when the unit was called out of reserve. On 10 November 1917, the Tenth Battalion took the feature with light casualties.
A further attack by the Second Division the same day pushed the Germans from the slopes to the east of the town. The high ground was now firmly under Allied control.
After all was said and done, General Currie's casualty estimations sadly proved to be remarkably accurate. The battle of Passchendaele cost the Canadian Corps 15 654 casualties with over 4 000 dead to take roughly 2 square miles or just over 5.2 square kilometres of German held territory in 16 days of fighting.
Canadian soldiers won a remarkable 9 Victoria Crosses in the fighting at Passchendale.
Passchendaele could be regarded, by some, as a re-play of the Somme; an offensive mounted by the British and French Forces designed to make large gains in terms of territory. However, given the importance of the Ypres salient — the campaign to clear the high ground east and south of the much battered city was important, but once it began, it had to be completed.
After months of fighting, the Allies had crawled forward 5 miles (8 kilometres) but had gained the high ground that dominated the salient. The price had been almost half a million men of which around 140,000 had been killed. Also reminiscent of the Somme were the colossal artillery barrages which failed to destroy German defenses, but which did inflict enormous losses that the Germans couldn't afford. Ultimately, as a battle of attrition, that captured some important assets, the campaign can be said to be a lean Allied victory.
Because of the Third Battle of Ypres there were insufficient reserves available to exploit the Allied success at the Battle of Cambrai, the first breakthrough by massed tanks, that restored somewhat the shaken confidence of the British government in the final victory. The politicians were reluctant however to fully replace the manpower losses, for fear the new troops would be sacrificed also. This made the British Army vulnerable to a German attack.
The major German offensive of 1918, Operation Michael, began on 21 March 1918, and a supporting operation which became the Battle of the Lys, began on 9 April. This regained almost all of the ground taken by the Allies at Passchendaele, with the Germans advancing about 6 miles (9.7 km). This meant that every inch of ground gained in the offensive was lost to the Germans, in a space of about three days. However, the Germans were also easily pushed away from Ypres once more in the final and fifth battle around the city in September and October of 1918.
Altogether, the four years of fighting around Ypres claimed the lives of some 300,000 soldiers of the British Empire; of whom 90,000 have no known graves. These battles, and those British Empire soldiers who gave their lives, are commemorated at the Menin Gate Memorial in Ypres, the Tyne Cot Cemetery and Memorial to the missing, the largest Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery in the world with nearly 12,000 graves. The German cemetery in the region is also a massive one, as a sizeable proportion of their casualties on the Western Front also fell around Ypres.
More than any other battle, Passchendaele has come to symbolise the horrific nature of the great battles of the First World War. In terms of the dead, the Germans lost approximately 260,000 men, while the British Empire forces lost about 300,000, including approximately 36,500 Australians, 3,596 New Zealanders and some 16,000 Canadians from 1915 to 1917. 90,000 British and Dominion bodies were never identified, and 42,000 never recovered. Aerial photography showed 1,000,000 shell holes in 1 square mile (2.56 km²).
Squire nagged and bullied till I went to fight,(Under Lord Derby's Scheme). I died in hell-(They called it Passchendaele). My wound was slight,And I was hobbling back; and then a shellBurst slick upon the duck-boards: so I fellInto the bottomless mud, and lost the light.At sermon-time, while Squire is in his pew,He gives my gilded name a thoughtful stare:For, though low down upon the list, I'm there;'In proud and glorious memory' ... that's my due.Two bleeding years I fought in France, for Squire:I suffered anguish that he's never guessed.Once I came home on leave: and then went west...What greater glory could a man desire?"― Siegfried Sassoon-"Memorial Tablet" from Picture Show, (1920) E.P. Dutton The horror of the shell-hole area of Verdun was surpassed. It was no longer life at all. It was mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves, slowly, but steadily, and in dense masses. Caught in the advanced zone by our hail of fire they often collapsed, and the lonely man in the shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass came on again. Rifle and machine-gun jammed with the mud. Man fought against man, and only too often the mass was successful.
—General Erich Ludendorff I stood up and looked over the front of my hole. There was just a dreary waste of mud and water, no relic of civilization, only shell holes… And everywhere were bodies, English and German, in all stages of decomposition.
—Lieutenant Edwin Campion Vaughan
"Passchendaele was just a terrible, terrible place. We used to walk along these wooden duckboards - something like ladders laid on the ground. The Germans would concentrate on these things. If a man was hit and wounded and fell off he could easily drown in the mud and never be seen again. You just did not want to go off the duckboards." Pte Richard Mercer, CEF-1CMMGB, 911016
I fell in a trench. There was a fella there. He must have been about our age. He was ripped shoulder to waist with shrapnel. I held his hand for the last 60 seconds of his life. He only said one word: 'Mother'. I didn't see her, but she was there. No doubt about it. He passed from this life into the next, and it felt as if I was in God's presence. I've never got over it. You never forget it. Never.
—Harry Patch, last survivor of Passchendaele, 12/07/2007 Some of the boys buried here are the same age as me, killed on the same day I was fighting. Anyone of them could have been me. I didn't know whether I would last longer than 5 minutes. We were the Poor Bloody Infantry and we were expendable. What a terrible waste.
Tyne Cot Cemetery its graves, memorial wall and blockhouses is seen by many to be a testament to the ANZAC contribution to the Battle of Passchendaele as the ANZAC forces were the troops who wrested the stronghold from the German defenders. There are of course numerous tributes and memorials all over Australia and New Zealand like the plaques at the Christchurch and Dunedin railway stations to the men of the NZ railway who fell at Passchendaele and in the Great War.
After the war, Canada placed memorials at eight sites where the Canadian Corps had made significant contributions to the fighting in the Great War. The Canadian Battle of Passchendale Memorial is located at the former site of the 'Crest Farm' on the southwest fringe of Passendale village. The memorial is on a street named Canadalaan, which leads from the village further southwest to the final resting place of many of the Canadians killed in the battle, Tyne Cot Cemetery.
One of the newest memorials to be dedicated to the fighting contribution of a group is the Celtic Cross memorial commemorating the Scottish contribution and efforts to the fighting in Flanders during the Great War. The memorial is located on the Frezenberg Ridge where Scotlands 9th and 15th Divisions, as part of the British Army, fought during the Battle of Passchendaele. The monument was dedicated by the Scottish Parliament's Minister for Europe Linda Fabiani during the late summer of 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle.
The Battle of Verdun
Verdun was the site of the Battle of Verdun in 1916 during World War I. One of the costliest battles of the war, Verdun exemplified the policy of a 'war of attrition' pursued by both sides, which led to an enormous loss of life.
After the failure of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 and the solidifying of the western front, Germany remained on the strategic defensive in the west throughout most of 1915. In the winter of 1915–1916, German General Erich von Falkenhayn, the chief of the German General Staff (1914–1916) made plans for a large offensive on the western front that ultimately aimed to break Great Britain, who he believed was Germany's main enemy. Falkenhayn argued that Britain, hidden behind the shield of the French Army, could be met head on and defeated only after this shield was broken. As Falkenhayn recalled it, his so-called Christmas memorandum to Kaiser Wilhelm II envisioned a massive but limited attack on a French position 'for the retention of which the French Command would be compelled to throw in every man they have'. Once the French army had bled to death, Britain could be brought down by Germany's submarine blockade and superior military strength. The logic of initiating a battle not to gain territory or a strategic position but simply to create a self-sustaining killing ground — to bleed the French Army white — pointed to the grimness of military realities in 1916.
Recent scholarship by Holger Afflerbach and others, however, has questioned the veracity of the Christmas memo. No copy has ever surfaced and the only account of it appeared in Falkenhayn's post-war memoir. His army commanders at Verdun, including the German Crown Prince, denied any knowledge of an attrition strategy. It seems likely that Falkenhayn did not specifically design the battle to bleed the French Army but justified ex-post-facto the motive of the Verdun offensive, despite its failure.
Verdun was the strongest point in pre-war France, ringed by a string of powerful forts, including Douaumont and Vaux. By 1916, the salient at Verdun jutted into the German lines and lay vulnerable to attack from three sides. The historic city of Verdun had been a Gallic fortress before Roman times and later a key asset in wars against Prussia, and Falkenhayn suspected that the French would throw as many men as necessary into its defense. Ironically, France had substantially weakened Verdun's defenses after the outbreak of war, an oversight that would contribute to the removal of Joseph Joffre from supreme command in the summer of 1916. The attack was slated to begin on February 12, then 16, but snow forced repeated postponements.
Falkenhayn massed artillery to the north and east of Verdun to precede the infantry advance with intensive artillery bombardment. His attack would hit the French positions on the right bank of the Meuse. Although French intelligence had warned of his plans, these warnings were ignored by the French Command and troop levels in the area remained low. Consequently, Verdun was utterly unprepared for the initial bombardment on the morning of 21 February 1916. German infantry attacks followed that afternoon and met tenacious but ultimately inadequate resistance for the first four days. On 25 February the Germans occupied Fort Douaumont. French reinforcements — now under the leadership of General Petain — began to arrive and were instantly thrown into "the furnace" (as the battle was called) to slow the German advance, no matter what the cost. Over the next several days, the stubborn defense managed to slow the German advance with a series of bloody counter-attacks. In March, Falkenhayn decided to target the French positions on the left bank of the Meuse as well, broadening the offensive front twofold. Throughout March and April, Le Mort Homme and Hill 304 were under continuous heavy bombardment and relentless infantry attacks. Meanwhile, Pétain organised repeated, small-scale counter-attacks to slow the German advance. He also ensured that the Bar-le-Duc road into Verdun — the only one to survive German shelling — remained open. It became known as La Voie Sacree ('the Sacred Way') because it continued to carry vital supplies and reinforcements into the Verdun front despite constant artillery attack.
German gains continued in June, but slowly and only after increasingly heavy losses on their side. They attacked the heights on both banks of the river. On 7 June, following almost a week of bitter resistance, Fort Vaux fell to the Germans after a murderous hand-to-hand fight inside the very fort. On 23 June the Germans reached what would become the furthest point of their advance. The line was just in front of Fort Souville, the last stronghold before Verdun itself. Pétain was making plans to evacuate the right bank of the Meuse when the Allies' offensive on the Somme River was launched on 1 July, partly to relieve pressure on the French. The Germans could no longer afford to continue their offensive at Verdun when they were needed so desperately on the Somme. At a cost of some 400,000 German casualties and a similar number of French, the attack was finally called off. Germany had failed to bleed France to death.
The battle continued, however, from October to the end of the year. French offensives, employing new tactics devised by Pétain's deputy, General Robert Nivelle, regained the forts and territory they had lost earlier. This was the only gleam of hope in an otherwise abysmal landscape.
Overall, the battle lasted 11 months. Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenberg,as Chief of General Staff.General Nivelle was promoted over the head of General Pétain to replace Generalissimo Joffre as French supreme commander, although he was to hold the post for less than six months.
Today, the battle of Verdun can be played as a level in the videogame Call of Duty 3, in which there is a symmetrical fort interlinked with tunnels and a small bunker in the center of the map.
There are many French and German cemeteries throughout the battlefield. The largest is the French National Cemetery and Douaumont ossuary, near Fort Douaumont. Thirteen thousand crosses adorn the field in front of the ossuary, which holds roughly 130,000 unidentified remains brought in from the battlefield. Every year yields more remains, which are often placed inside the ossuary's vaults.
Among many revered memorials on the battlefield is the "Bayonet Trench", which marks the location where some dozen bayonets lined up in a row were discovered projecting out of the ground after the war; below each rifle was the body of a French soldier. It is believed that these belonged to a group of soldiers who had rested their rifles against the parapet of the trench they were occupying when they were killed during a bombardment. The men were buried where they lay in the trench and the rifles left untouched.
Nearby, the World War I Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery and Memorial is located east of the village and is the final resting place for 14,246 American military dead, most of whom died in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The chapel contains a memorial to the 954 American missing whose remains were never recovered or identified.
After the failure of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914 and the solidifying of the western front, Germany remained on the strategic defensive in the west throughout most of 1915. In the winter of 1915–1916, German General Erich von Falkenhayn, the chief of the German General Staff (1914–1916) made plans for a large offensive on the western front that ultimately aimed to break Great Britain, who he believed was Germany's main enemy. Falkenhayn argued that Britain, hidden behind the shield of the French Army, could be met head on and defeated only after this shield was broken. As Falkenhayn recalled it, his so-called Christmas memorandum to Kaiser Wilhelm II envisioned a massive but limited attack on a French position 'for the retention of which the French Command would be compelled to throw in every man they have'. Once the French army had bled to death, Britain could be brought down by Germany's submarine blockade and superior military strength. The logic of initiating a battle not to gain territory or a strategic position but simply to create a self-sustaining killing ground — to bleed the French Army white — pointed to the grimness of military realities in 1916.
Recent scholarship by Holger Afflerbach and others, however, has questioned the veracity of the Christmas memo. No copy has ever surfaced and the only account of it appeared in Falkenhayn's post-war memoir. His army commanders at Verdun, including the German Crown Prince, denied any knowledge of an attrition strategy. It seems likely that Falkenhayn did not specifically design the battle to bleed the French Army but justified ex-post-facto the motive of the Verdun offensive, despite its failure.
Verdun was the strongest point in pre-war France, ringed by a string of powerful forts, including Douaumont and Vaux. By 1916, the salient at Verdun jutted into the German lines and lay vulnerable to attack from three sides. The historic city of Verdun had been a Gallic fortress before Roman times and later a key asset in wars against Prussia, and Falkenhayn suspected that the French would throw as many men as necessary into its defense. Ironically, France had substantially weakened Verdun's defenses after the outbreak of war, an oversight that would contribute to the removal of Joseph Joffre from supreme command in the summer of 1916. The attack was slated to begin on February 12, then 16, but snow forced repeated postponements.
Falkenhayn massed artillery to the north and east of Verdun to precede the infantry advance with intensive artillery bombardment. His attack would hit the French positions on the right bank of the Meuse. Although French intelligence had warned of his plans, these warnings were ignored by the French Command and troop levels in the area remained low. Consequently, Verdun was utterly unprepared for the initial bombardment on the morning of 21 February 1916. German infantry attacks followed that afternoon and met tenacious but ultimately inadequate resistance for the first four days. On 25 February the Germans occupied Fort Douaumont. French reinforcements — now under the leadership of General Petain — began to arrive and were instantly thrown into "the furnace" (as the battle was called) to slow the German advance, no matter what the cost. Over the next several days, the stubborn defense managed to slow the German advance with a series of bloody counter-attacks. In March, Falkenhayn decided to target the French positions on the left bank of the Meuse as well, broadening the offensive front twofold. Throughout March and April, Le Mort Homme and Hill 304 were under continuous heavy bombardment and relentless infantry attacks. Meanwhile, Pétain organised repeated, small-scale counter-attacks to slow the German advance. He also ensured that the Bar-le-Duc road into Verdun — the only one to survive German shelling — remained open. It became known as La Voie Sacree ('the Sacred Way') because it continued to carry vital supplies and reinforcements into the Verdun front despite constant artillery attack.
German gains continued in June, but slowly and only after increasingly heavy losses on their side. They attacked the heights on both banks of the river. On 7 June, following almost a week of bitter resistance, Fort Vaux fell to the Germans after a murderous hand-to-hand fight inside the very fort. On 23 June the Germans reached what would become the furthest point of their advance. The line was just in front of Fort Souville, the last stronghold before Verdun itself. Pétain was making plans to evacuate the right bank of the Meuse when the Allies' offensive on the Somme River was launched on 1 July, partly to relieve pressure on the French. The Germans could no longer afford to continue their offensive at Verdun when they were needed so desperately on the Somme. At a cost of some 400,000 German casualties and a similar number of French, the attack was finally called off. Germany had failed to bleed France to death.
The battle continued, however, from October to the end of the year. French offensives, employing new tactics devised by Pétain's deputy, General Robert Nivelle, regained the forts and territory they had lost earlier. This was the only gleam of hope in an otherwise abysmal landscape.
Overall, the battle lasted 11 months. Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenberg,as Chief of General Staff.General Nivelle was promoted over the head of General Pétain to replace Generalissimo Joffre as French supreme commander, although he was to hold the post for less than six months.
Today, the battle of Verdun can be played as a level in the videogame Call of Duty 3, in which there is a symmetrical fort interlinked with tunnels and a small bunker in the center of the map.
There are many French and German cemeteries throughout the battlefield. The largest is the French National Cemetery and Douaumont ossuary, near Fort Douaumont. Thirteen thousand crosses adorn the field in front of the ossuary, which holds roughly 130,000 unidentified remains brought in from the battlefield. Every year yields more remains, which are often placed inside the ossuary's vaults.
Among many revered memorials on the battlefield is the "Bayonet Trench", which marks the location where some dozen bayonets lined up in a row were discovered projecting out of the ground after the war; below each rifle was the body of a French soldier. It is believed that these belonged to a group of soldiers who had rested their rifles against the parapet of the trench they were occupying when they were killed during a bombardment. The men were buried where they lay in the trench and the rifles left untouched.
Nearby, the World War I Meuse-Argonne American Cemetery and Memorial is located east of the village and is the final resting place for 14,246 American military dead, most of whom died in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The chapel contains a memorial to the 954 American missing whose remains were never recovered or identified.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
